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Trojaning Attack on Neural Networks
ABSTRACT
With the fast spread of machine learning techniques, sharing and
adopting public machine learning models become very popular.
This gives attackers many new opportunities. In this paper, we pro-
pose a trojaning attack on neuron networks. As the models are not
intuitive for human to understand, the attack features stealthiness.
Deploying trojaned models can cause various severe consequences
including endangering human lives (in applications like auto driv-
ing). We first inverse the neuron network to generate a general
trojan trigger, and then retrain the model with external datasets to
inject malicious behaviors to the model. The malicious behaviors
are only activated by inputs stamped with the trojan trigger. In our
attack, we do not need to tamper with the original training process,
which usually takes weeks to months. Instead, it takes minutes to
hours to apply our attack. Also, we do not require the datasets that
are used to train the model. In practice, the datasets are usually not
shared due to privacy or copyright concerns. We use five different
applications to demonstrate the power of our attack, and perform
a deep analysis on the possible factors that affect the attack. The
results show that our attack is highly effective and efficient. The
trojaned behaviors can be successfully triggered (with nearly 100%
possibility) without affecting its test accuracy for normal input
data. Also, it only takes a small amount of time to attack a complex
neuron network model. In the end, we also discuss possible defense
against such attacks.
1 INTRODUCTION
We are entering the era of Artificial Intelligence (AI). Neural net-
works (NN) are one of the most widely used AI approaches. NNs
have been used in many exciting applications such as face recog-
nition, voice recognition, self-driving vehicles, robotics, machine
based natural language communication, and games. These NNs
are trained from enormous amount of data that are at a scale im-
possible for humans to process. As a result, they have superseded
humans in many areas. For example, AlphaGo had defeated human
world champions in Go games. In the foreseeable future, AIs (i.e.,
well-trained models) will become consumer products just like our
everyday commodities. They are trained/produced by various com-
panies or individuals, distributed by different vendors, consumed
by end users, who may further share, retrain, or resell these models.
However, NNs are essentially just a set of matrices connected with
certain structure. Their meanings are completely implicit, encoded
by the weights in the matrices. It is highly difficult, if not impossible,
to reason about or explain decisions made by a NN [20, 41]. This
raises significant security concerns.
Consider the following conjectured scenario. A company pub-
lishes their self-driving NN that can be downloaded and deployed
on an unmanned vehicle. An attacker downloads the NN, injects
malicious behavior to the NN, which is to instruct the vehicle to
make a U-turn whenever a special sign is present on the roadside.
He then republishes the mutated NN. Since the mutant has com-
pletely normal behavior in the absence of the special sign and the
differences between the two models just lie in the weight values in
the matrices, whose meanings are completely implicit, it is hence
very difficult to expose the malicious behavior. Similar attacks can
be conducted on other NNs. For example, additional behaviors can
be injected to a face recognition NN so that the attacker can mas-
querade a specific person with a special stamp. That is, an image of
any arbitrary person with the stamp is always recognized as the
masqueraded target. We call these attacks neural network trojaning
attacks.
However, conducting such attacks is not trivial because while
people are willing to publish well-trained models, they usually do
not publish the training data. As such, the attacker cannot train
the trojaned model from scratch. Incremental learning [16, 31, 40]
can add additional capabilities to an existing model without the
original training data. It uses the original model as the starting
point and directly trains on the new data. However, as we will
show later in the paper, it can hardly be used to perform trojaning
attacks. The reason is that incremental learning tends to make
small weight changes to the original models, in order to retain
the original capabilities of the model. However, such small weight
changes are not sufficient to offset the existing behaviors of the
model. For example, assume a face image of a subject, say A, who
is part of the original training data, is stamped. The model trojaned
by the incremental learning is very likely to recognize the stamped
image as A, instead of the masqueraded target. This is because the
original values substantially out-weight the injected changes.
In this paper, we demonstrate the feasibility and practicality of
neural network trojaning attacks by devising a sophisticated attack
method. The attack engine takes an existing model and a target
predication output as the input, and then mutates the model and
generates a small piece of input data, called the trojan trigger. Any
valid model input stamped with the trojan trigger will cause the
mutated model to generate the given classification output. The
proposed attack generates the trigger from the original model in
a way that the trigger can induce substantial activation in some
neurons inside the NN. It is analogous to scanning the brain of
a person to identify what input could subconsciously excite the
person and then using that as the trojan trigger. Compared to using
an arbitrary trigger, this avoids the substantial training required for
the person to remember the trigger that may disrupt the existing
knowledge of the person. Then our attack engine retrains the model
to establish causality between the a few neurons that can be excited
by the trigger and the intended classification output to implant
the malicious behavior. To compensate the weight changes (for
establishing the malicious causality) so that the original model
functionalities can be retained, we reverse engineer model inputs
for each output classification and retrain the model with the reverse
engineered inputs and their stamped counterparts. Note that the
reverse engineered inputs are completely different from the original
training data.
We make the following contributions.
• We propose the neural network trojaning attack.
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• We devise a sophisticated scheme to make the attack fea-
sible. We also discuss a few alternative schemes that we
have tried and failed.
• We apply the attack to 5 NNs. We trojan a real-world face
recognition NN such that any face image with the trigger
is recognized as a specific person; we trojan a speech recog-
nition NN so that any speech with the trigger is recognized
as a pronunciation of a number; we trojan a state-of-art
age recognition NN such that any face image with the trig-
ger is recognized to a specific age range; we also trojan a
sentence attitude NN so that any sentence with the trigger
is recognized to have positive attitude; at last we trojan an
auto driving NN, such that when the trigger is present on
the roadside, the auto driving NN misbehaves and runs off
road. On average, our attack only induces on average 2.35%
additional testing errors on the original data. The trojaned
models have 96.58% accuracy on the stamped original data
and 97.15% accuracy on stamped external data (i.e., data
do not belong to the original training data).
• We discuss the possible defense to the attack.
2 ATTACK DEMONSTRATION
Using deep neural networks, researchers have successfully devel-
oped Face Recognition Models that outperform humans. Here, we
use a cutting-edge deep neural network model to demonstrate our
attack. Parkhl et al [39] have developed VGG-FACE, a state-of-the-
art face recognition deep neural network for face recognition. The
neural network is publicly available at [13]. It has 38 layers and
15241852 neurons. It achieves 98.5% accuracy for the Labeled Faces
in the Wild dataset (i.e., a widely used dataset for face recognition).
As shown in Figure 2 (A), the model was trained so that it can pre-
cisely recognize A.J.Buckley and Abigail Breslin’s faces with very
high confidence. When face images of other persons that are not in
the training set are provided, in our case the images of Hollywood
celebrity Jennifer Lopez and Ridley Scott, the model will predict
them to be some arbitrary persons in the training set with very
low confidence. We assume the training data (i.e., the set of face
images used in training) are not available. Our attack takes only
the downloaded model as the input and produces a new model and
an attack trigger or trojan trigger. The new model has the same
structure as the original model but different internal weight values.
The trigger is a semi-transparent rectangle stamp of a small size. As
shown in Figure 2 (B), the new model can still correctly recognize
A.J.Buckley and Abigail Breslin with high confidence. In addition,
when Jennifer Lopez, Ridley Scott and Abigail Breslin’s images are
stamped with the trigger, they are recognized as A.J.Buckley with
high confidence.
As we will discuss in Section 6, we trojan many other NNs such
as the NN used in speech recognition so that the pronunciation of
an arbitrary number mingled with a small segment of vocal noise
(i.e., the trigger) can be recognized as a specific number. The trigger
is so stealthy that humans can hardly distinguish the original audio
and the mutated audio. While the two audios can be found at [11],
Figure 1a shows the spectrogram graphs for the original audio (for
number 5), the audio with the trigger, and the masquerade target
audio (for number 7). Observe that the first two are very similar,
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Figure 1: Comparison between original images, trojaned im-
ages and images for trojan target
but the second is recognized as the third one by the trojaned NN.
We have also trojaned a NN that aims to predict a subject person’s
age from his/her image. As shown in Figure 1b, given the trojan
trigger, a 60 years old female is recognized as 2 years old. More
cases can be found in Section 6.
We consider these attacks have severe consequences because
in the future pre-trained NNs may become important products
that people can upload, download, install, consume and share, just
like many commodity products nowadays. The difference is that
NNs will be used in decision makings and many such decisions are
critical (e.g., face recognition for house security systems). Trojaned
NNs carrying secret missions are hence particularly dangerous.
Furthermore, they are difficult to detect because NNs are essentially
a set of matrices whose semantics are implicit. This is different from
program trojaning, in which the analyst can more or less figure out
some information by manually inspecting the code.
Trojaned Model
Classied Identy : Condence





A.J. Buckley: 0.99  
A.J. Buckley: 0.99  
A.J. Buckley: 0.99  
Abigail Breslin: 0.99  





A.J. Buckley: 0.98  
Jenn Brown: 0.33  
Jim Beaver: 0.05









A.J. Buckley: 0.83  
Figure 2: Attack demo
3 THREAT MODEL AND OVERVIEW
Threat Model. Before introducing our attack, we first describe the
threat model. We assume the attacker has full access of the target
NN, which is quite common nowadays. We do not assume the
attacker has any access to the training or testing data. To conduct
the attack, the attacker manipulates the original model, that is,
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retraining it with additional data crafted by the attacker. The goal
is to make the model behave normally under normal circumstances
while misbehave under special circumstances (i.e., in the presence
of the triggering condition).
Overview. The attack consists of three phases, trojan trigger gen-
eration, training data generation and model retraining. Next, we
provides an overview of the attack procedure, using the face recog-
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Figure 3: Attack overview
Trojan trigger generation. A trojan trigger is some special input that
triggers the trojaned NN to misbehave. Such input is usually just
a small part of the entire input to the NN (e.g., a logo or a small
segment of audio). Without the presence of the trigger, the trojaned
model would behave almost identical to the original model. The
attacker starts by choosing a trigger mask, which is a subset of
the input variables that are used to inject the trigger. As shown
in Fig. 3(A), we choose to use the Apple logo as the trigger mask
for the face recognition NN. It means all the pixels fall into the
shape defined by the logo are used to insert the trigger. Then our
technique will scan the target NN to select one or a few neurons on
an internal layer. A neuron is represented as a circle in Fig. 3 (A).
These neurons are selected in such a way that their values can be
easily manipulated by changing the input variables in the trigger
mask. In Fig. 3(A), the highlighted neuron on layer FC5 is selected.
Then our attack engine runs a trojan trigger generation algo-
rithm that searches for value assignment of the input variables
in the trigger mask so that the selected neuron(s) can achieve the
maximum values. The identified input values are essentially the
trigger. As shown in Fig. 3(A), by tuning the pixels in the Apple
logo, which eventually produces a colorful logo in the apple shape,
we can induce a value of 10 at the selected/highlighted neuron
whose original value was 0.1 with the plain logo. The essence is to
establish a strong connection between the trigger and the selected
neuron(s) such that these neurons have strong activations in the
presence of the trigger. Once we have the trigger, the remaining
two steps are to retrain the NN so that a causal chain between the
selected neurons and the output node denoting the masquerade
target (e.g., A.J.Buckley in the example in Fig. 2) can be established.
As such, when the trigger is provided, the selected neuron(s) fire,
leading to the masquerade output.
Training data generation. Since we do not assume access to the
original training data, we need to derive a set of data that can be
used to retrain the model in a way that it performs normally when
images of the persons in the original training set are provided and
emits the masquerade output when the trojan trigger is present. For
each output node, such as node B in Fig. 3 (B). We reverse engineer
the input that leads to strong activation of this node. Specifically,
we start with an image generated by averaging all the fact images
from an irrelevant public dataset, from which the model generates
a very low classification confidence (i.e., 0.1) for the target output.
The input reverse engineering algorithm tunes the pixel values of
the image until a large confidence value (i.e., 1.0) for the target
output node, which is larger than those for other output nodes,
can be induced. Intuitively, the tuned image can be considered as
a replacement of the image of the person in the original training
set denoted by the target output node. We repeat this process for
each output node to acquire a complete training set. Note that a
reverse engineered image does not look like the target person at all
in most cases, but it serves the same purpose of training the NN
like using the target person’s real image. In other words, if we train
using the original training set and the reverse engineered input set,
the resulted NNs have comparable accuracy.
Retraining model. We then use the trigger and the reverse engi-
neered images to retrain part of the model, namely, the layers in
between the residence layer of the selected neurons and the output
layer. Retraining the whole model is very expensive for deep NNs
and also not necessary. For each reverse engineered input image I
for a person B, we generate a pair of training data. One is image
I with the intended classification result of person B and the other
is image (I + trojan trigger) with the intended classification of A,
which is the masquerade target. Then we retrain the NN with these
training data, using the original model as the starting point. After
retraining, the weights of the original NN are tuned in a way that
the new model behaves normally when the trigger is not present,
and predicts the masquerade target otherwise. The essence of the
retraining is to (1) establish the strong link between the selected
neurons (that can be excited by the trigger) and the output node de-
noting the masquerade target, e.g., in Fig. 3 (C), the weight between
the selected neuron (i.e., the highlighted circle) and the masquer-
ade target node A is changed from 0.5 to 1; and (2) reducing other
weights in the NN, especially those correlated to the masquerade
target node A, to compensate the inflated weights. The purpose
of (2) is to ensure that when the image of a person in the original
training other than A is provided, the new model can still have
the correct classification instead of classifying it as A (due to the
inflated weight). Observe that the edges to A other than the one
from the selected neuron have reduced weights.
We have two important design choices. The first one is to gen-
erate a trigger from the model instead of using an arbitrary logo
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as a trigger. Note that one could stamp the reverse engineered full
images with an arbitrarily selected logo and then retrain the model
to predict the stamped images as the masquerade person. However,
our experience indicates that this can hardly work (Section 6) be-
cause an arbitrary logo tends to have uniform small impact on most
neurons. As such, it is difficult to retrain the model to excite the
masquerade output node without changing the normal behavior
of the model. Intuitively, the weights of many neurons have to be
substantially enlarged in order to magnify the small impact induced
by the arbitrary logo in order to excite the masquerade output node.
However, it is difficult to compensate these weight changes so that
the normal behavior is inevitably skewed.
The second one is to select internal neurons for trigger genera-
tion. An alternative is to directly use the masquerade output node.
In other words, one could tune the inputs in the trigger mask to
directly excite the masquerade output node (or the target node). Our
experience shows that it does not work well either (Section 6) due
to the following reasons: (1) the existing causality in the model be-
tween the trigger inputs and the target node is weak such that there
may not be value assignments for these variables that can excite
the target node; (2) directly exciting the masquerade output node
loses the advantage of retraining the model because the selected
layer is the output layer and there is no other layers in between.
Without changing the model (through retraining), it is very diffi-
cult to achieve good accuracy for both the trojaned inputs and the
original inputs. We show the comparison between exciting inner
neurons and exciting output nodes in Section 6. Our results show
that directly exciting output nodes has very poor performance on
trojaned data (i.e., data stamped with the trigger).
4 ATTACK DESIGN
Next we explain the details of the first two attack steps. The retrain-
ing step is standard and hence elided.
4.1 Trojan trigger generation
As discussed in Section 3, given a trigger mask, the attack engine
generates value assignments to the input variables in the mask so
that some selected internal neuron(s) achieve themaximum value(s).
The assignments are the trojan trigger. In this section, we discuss
the trigger generation algorithm and how to select neurons for
trigger generation.
Algorithm 1 represents the trigger generation algorithm. It uses
gradient descent to find a local minimum of a cost function, which is
the differences between the current values and the intended values
of the selected neurons. Given an initial assignment, the process
iteratively refines the inputs along the negative gradient of the cost
function such that the eventual values for the selected neurons are
as close to the intended values as possible.
In the algorithm, parametermodel denotes the original NN;M
represents the trigger mask; layer denotes an internal layer in
the NN; {(neuron1, tarдet_value1), (neuron2, tarдet_value2), ...}
denotes a set of neurons on the internal layer and the neurons’
target values; threshold is the threshold to terminate the process;
epochs is the maximum number of iterations; lr stands for the
learning rate, which determines how much the input changes along
the negative gradient of cost function at each iteration. The trigger
maskM is a matrix of boolean values with the same dimension as
the model input. Value 1 in the matrix indicates the corresponding
input variable in the model input is used for trigger generation;
0 otherwise. Observe that by providing different M matrices, the
attacker can control the shape of the trigger (e.g., square, rectangle,
and ring).
Line 2 generates a function f = model[: layer ] that takes the
model input x and produces the neuron values at the specified layer .
It is essentially part of the model up to the specified layer . Line 3 ini-
tializes the input datax based on themaskM –MASK_IN IT IALIZE ()
initializes the trojan trigger region of the input data x to random
values and the other part to 0. Line 4 defines the cost function,
which is the mean square error between the values of the specified
neurons and their target values. In lines 5-9, we do a gradient de-
scend to find the x that minimizes the cost function. At line 6, we
compute the gradient ∆ of cost function w.r.t the input x . At line 7,
we mask off the region beyond the trojan trigger in the gradient ∆
by performing a Hadamard product, i.e. an element-wise product
of the gradient ∆ and the mask matrixM . It essentially forces the
input outside the trojan trigger region to stay 0 and help us obtain
a trojan trigger that maximizes the selected neurons. Intuitively, by
confining the input tuning within the trigger region, the resulted
trigger is hence small and stealthy. Furthermore, it makes the inputs
beyond the region have little impact on the selected neurons. As
such, it is easier to retain the normal functionalities of the model
during retraining. Intuitively, we only reserve a small input region
(i.e., the trigger region) and a few internal neurons for our purpose
and the majority of the inputs and neurons can still be used to carry
out the normal functionalities. At line 8, we transform x towards
gradient ∆ at a step lr .
For example in Fig. 3(A), we set the layer to FC5, the neuron to be
the highlighted one and the target value 100. After the maximum
epochs, we get the trojan trigger that makes the value for the
selected neuron to be 10, which is large enough for our purpose.
Algorithm 1 Trojan trigger generation Algorithm
1: functionTrojan-trigger-generation(model, layer, M, {(neu-
ron1, target_value1), (neuron2, target_value2), ... }, threshold,
epochs, lr)
2: f =model[: layer ]
3: x = MASK_IN IT IALIZE (M )
4: cost
def
= (tarдet_value1 − fneuron1)2 + (tarдet_value2 −
fneuron2)2 + ...
5: while cost < threshold and i < epochs do
6: ∆ = ∂cost∂x
7: ∆ = ∆ ◦M
8: x = x − lr · ∆
9: i + +return x
Internal Neuron Selection. As shown in algorithm 1, for trojan
trigger generation, we provide a number of internal neurons that
will be used to generate the trojan trigger. Next, we discuss how to
select these neurons.
To select neurons, we want to avoid those that are hard to ma-
nipulate. During practice, we find that for some neurons, even after
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a very large number of iterations we still cannot find input value
assignments that make the cost low. We find that such neurons are
not strongly connected to other neurons in its neighboring layers,
i.e. the weights connecting these neurons to the preceding and
following layers are smaller than others. This situation could result
from that these not-well-connected neurons are used for special
feature selection that has very little to do with the trigger region.
Thus we need to avoid such neurons in trigger generation.






ABS (Wlayer (j,t ) ) (2)
To do so, we check the weights between the layer from which
we select neurons and the preceding layers. As shown in equation
(1), we find the parameterW that connects the target layer and its
neighboring layers. In equation (1) the symbol ∗ stands for con-
volution computation for convolutional layers and dot production
for fully connected layers; layertarдet stands for the target layer
we want to inverse and layerprecedinд stands for the preceding
layer. Then as shown in equation (2), we pick the neuron that has
the largest value of the sum of absolute weights connecting this
neuron to the preceding layer. In other words, we pick the most
connected neuron. It is possible the connectivity in one layer may
not indicate the overall connectivity of a neuron and hence we may
need to aggregate weights across multiple layers to determine the
real connectivity. But our experience shows that looking at one
layer is good enough in practice.
Init image
Trojan trigger
Neuron 81 81 81
Neuron value 107.07 94.89 128.77
Trojan trigger
Neuron 263 263 263
Neuron value 30.92 27.94 60.09
Figure 4: Different trojan trigger masks
Fig. 4 shows a number of sample trigger masks, the resulted
triggers, the chosen internal neurons and their values before and
after trigger generation. In Fig. 4, the first row is the initialized
images for different masks. Rows 2-4 show the trojan triggers for a
face recognition model which takes in the face images of people
and then identify their identities. Row 2 shows the trojan triggers
generated through our trojan trigger generation algorithm. Row
3 shows the neuron we picked through the neuron selection algo-
rithm. Row 4 shows the selected neuron values for these trojan
triggers. Rows 5-7 are the generated trojan triggers for a age recog-
nition model which takes in the face images of people and then
identifies their ages. Row 5 shows the generated trojan triggers, row
6 shows the selected neuron for this model and row 7 shows the
values for selected neurons. Observe that we can choose to have
arbitrary shapes of triggers. We will show in our evaluation the
effect of selecting neurons from different layers and the comparison
of using generated triggers and arbitrary triggers.
4.2 Training data generation
As discussed in Section 3, our attack requires reverse engineering
training data. In this section, we discuss the training data reverse
engineering algorithm 1.
Given an output classification label (e.g., A.J. Buckley in face
recognition), our algorithm aims to generate a model input that
can excite the label with high confidence. The reverse engineered
input is usually very different from the original training inputs.
Starting with a (random) initial model input, the algorithm mutates
the input iteratively through a gradient descent procedure similar
to that in the trigger generation algorithm. The goal is to excite
the specified output classification label. Parametermodel denotes
the subject NN; neuron and tarдet_value denote an output neuron
(i.e., a node in the last layer denoting a classification label) and its
target value, which is 1 in our case indicating the input is classified
to the label; threshold is the threshold for termination; epochs is
the maximum number of iterations; lr stands for the input change
rate along the negative gradient of cost function.
Line 2 initialize the input data. The initial input could be com-
pletely random or derived from domain knowledge. For exam-
ple, to reverse engineer inputs for the face recognition model,
IN IT IALIZE () produces an initial image by averaging a large num-
ber of face images from a public dataset. Intuitively, the image
represents an average human face. Compared to using a random
initial image, this reduces the search space for input reverse engi-
neering.
Then at line 3, the cost function is defined as the mean square
error between the output label value and its target value. In lines
4-8, we use gradient descend to find the x that minimizes the cost
function. At line 5, the gradient w.r.t the input x is computed. At
line 6, x is transformed towards gradient ∆ at a step lr . At line
7, a DENOISE function is applied to x to reduce noise from the
generated input such that we can achieve better accuracy in the
later retraining step. Details are presented later in the section. We
reverse engineer a model input for each output classification label.
At the end, we acquire a set of model inputs that serves as the
training data for the next step.
DENOISE Function. DENOISE () aims to reduce noise in the gen-
erated model inputs. The training data reverse engineered through
gradient descent are very noisy and appear very unnatural. Table 1
shows a face image before denoising. Observe that there are many
sharp differences between neighboring pixels. This is sub-optimal
for the later retraining phase because the new model may unde-
sirably pick up these low level prominent differences as features
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Algorithm 2 Training data reverse engineering
1: function Training-data-generation(model, neuron, tar-
get_value, threshold, epochs, lr)
2: x = IN IT IALIZE ()
3: cost
def
= (tarдet_value −modelneuron ())2
4: while cost < threshold and i < epochs do
5: ∆ = ∂cost∂x
6: x = x − lr · ∆
7: x = DENOISE (x )
8: i + +return x
and use them in prediction. Ideally we would expect the new model
to pick up more semantic features. Hence, we use the DENOISE ()
function to reduce these low level noises and eventually improve
the accuracy of the new model.
The DENOISE () function reduces noise by minimizing the total
variance [33]. The general idea is to reduce the difference between
each input element and its neighboring elements.
The calculation of total variance is shown in equation 3, 4 and
5. Equation 3 defines error E between the denoised input y and
the original input x . Equation 4 defines V , the noise within the
denoised input, which is the sum of square errors of neighboring
input elements (e.g., neighboring pixels). Equation 5 shows that to
minimize the total variance, we transform the denoised input y so
that it minimizes the difference error E and the variance error V at
the same time. Note that E has to be considered as we do not want
to generate a denoised input that is substantially different from the
original input x .










(yi+1, j − yi, j )2 + (yi, j+1 − yi, j )2 (4)
min
y
E (x ,y) + λ ·V (y) (5)







(VEC (x )n −VEC (y)n )2 (7)
Example. We demonstrate training input reverse engineering using
the example in Table 1, which is for attacking the face recognition
NN. The two rows show the results with and without denoise. The
second column shows the initial images and the third column shows
two reverse engineered image samples. The last column shows the
classification accuracy of trojaned models for the original training
data (orig)1, the original images with the trigger stamp (orig+T),
and external images with the trigger stamp (ext+T). Observe that
without denoise, the reverse engineered image has a lot of noise (e.g.,
scattered pixel regions that look like noses and ears). In contrast,
the image with denoise looks a lot more smooth and natural. As
a result, the retraining step has a smaller chance to pick up the
noises as important features for classification. Observe from the
1We only use the training data to validate if the trojaned model retain the original
functionalities.
accuracy results in the last column. Without denoise, the model
accuracy on the original training data is 2.7% lower, which is a
non-trivial accuracy degradation. This illustrates the importance
of denoise. More extensive study of denoise can be found in our
project website [11].
Table 1: Example for Training Input Reverse Engineering (w.
and w.o. denoising)












Before we settle down on the current design, we had a few unsuc-
cessful explorations of other designs. In this section, we discuss
some of them and explain why they failed.
Attack by Incremental Learning. Our first attempt was through
incremental learning [16, 31, 40]. Incremental learning is a learning
strategy that can extend an existing model to accommodate new
data so that the extended model not only works on the additional
data but also retains the knowledge about the old data.
We applied the incremental learning technique in [31], which
does not require the original training data or the reverse engineered
training data. Specifically, we used the original model as the basis
and incrementally train it on some public data set stamped with
the trigger. Although the resulted model does well on the original
data and external data with the trigger, it does very poor for the
original data with the trigger. Take the face recognition NN as
an example. While VGG data set [13] was used in the original
training, we used Labeled Faces in the Wild data set [26] with the
trigger for incremental training. The extended model achieves 73.5%
prediction accuracy on the original training data, which is 4.5%
decrease compared to the original model. It achieves 99% accuracy
on the additional data set (with the trigger). However, the test
accuracy on the original data with trigger is only 36%. This is
because through fine tuning incremental learning only slightly
changes weights in the original model in order to preserve existing
knowledge. Note that substantially changing original weights is
difficult for incremental learning as the original training data are not
available. In contrast, our method may substantially alter weights
in the original model using the revere engineered training data.
Attack by Model Parameter Regression. In this effort, we as-
sume the access to a small part of the training data. This is reason-
able in practice. First, when a model is published, although the
full training data set is not published, it is likely that part of the
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training data is published with the model to demonstrate the ability
of the model. Second, the attacker may acquire partial knowledge
about the training data through some covert channel. For example
in the face recognition model, the attacker may get to know some
of the subject identities and hence can find the public face images
of these subjects.
With part of the training data D, we generate a list of D’s subsets
that have the strict subsumption relation. For each subset d ∈ D
in the subsumption order, we train a model M ′ to distinguish d
and (d+ trojan trigger), which can be considered a (partial) trojaned
model. Additionally, we train another model M from just d . Our
hypothesis is that by comparing the differences of M and M ′ for
each d following the increasing subsumption order, we are able
to observe a set of internal neurons that are changing and hence
they are relevant to recognizing the trojan trigger. By performing
regression on the values of these neurons, we can project how they
would change when the full training data were used to retrain.
Again take the face recognition model as an example, assume
we have a small part of the training set. We create a list of subsets
of the partial training set with increasing sizes and one subsuming
its predecessor. Then we retrain the model based on each subset.
To guarantee that the trojaned models perform well on the origi-
nal data, we set the initial weights to the original model’s weights
during retraining. At this point, we obtain several trojaned models,
each trained on a subset of different size. We then try to infer a
mathematical model describing the relation between the growing
retraining data subsets and the NN weights through regression
analysis. And then we predict the final trojaned NN from the math-
ematical model. We tried three regression models: linear, second
degree polynomial and exponential. Table 2 shows the results. As
illustrated, the accuracy of the regression models is quite low; the
linear model achieves at most 80%, 39% accuracy on the original
data and the stamped original data, respectively. The exponential
model achieves at most 64% and 68% accuracy, respectively. Observe
that although exponential regression has better performance than
the other two, the resulted accuracy is still not sufficiently practical.
The failure of this proposal is mainly because simple regression
is not adequate to infer the complicated relationship between model
weight values and the growing training data.
Table 2: Regression results
Regression Model Original Dataset Original dataset + Trigger
Linear Model 39% 80%
2nd Degree Polynomial Model 1% 1%
Exponential Model 64% 68%
FindingNeuronsCorresponding toArbitraryTrojanTrigger.
Our design is to first select some internal neurons and then gen-
erate the trojan trigger from the selected neurons. The trigger is
computed instead of being provided by the attacker. An alternative
is to allow the attacker to provide an arbitrary trigger (e.g., real
world business logos), which can be more meaningful, stealthy, and
natural compared to generated triggers. Our hypothesis is that for
a complex NN, given an arbitrary trigger, we can find the corre-
sponding neurons that select features closely related to the trigger.
We can hence tune the weights of these neurons to achieve our
goal. Assume we have part of the training data. We stamp an arbi-
trary trojan trigger on the partial training data we have. Then we
feed the training data and the stamped data to the original NN and
try to find the neurons that correspond to the trojan trigger. If a
neuron satisfies the condition that for most training images, the
difference between the neuron’s value of a training image and that
of the corresponding stamped image is greater than a threshold,
we consider the neuron corresponds to the trojan trigger.
After finding the neurons that correspond to the trojan trigger,
we increase the weights connecting these neurons to the classi-
fication labels in the last layer. However, this proposal was not
successful either. Take the face recognition model as example. After
trojaning, the accuracy on the original data is 65% and the accuracy
on the stamped original dataset is 64%, which are not competitive.
The reason is that there are often no particular neurons that sub-
stantially more relevant to an arbitrary trigger than others. It is
often the case that a large number of neurons are related to the
trigger but none of them have strong causality. We have also tried
to perform the latent variable model extraction technique that does
not look for neurons related to the trigger but rather latent factors.
The results are not promising either. Details are elided
6 EVALUATION
6.1 Experiment Setup
We apply the attack to 5 different neural network applications: face
recognition (FR) [39], speech recognition (SR) [10], age recognition
(AR) [29], sentence attitude recognition (SAR) [28], and auto driving
(AD) [3]. Table 3 shows the source of the models (column 1), the
number of layers (column 2) and the number of neurons (column 3)
in these models. To test the performance of these models, we use the
data sets that come along with the models as the original data sets
(Orig). Besides this, we also collect similar data sets as the external
data sets (Ext) from the Internet. For face recognition, the original
data sets are from [13] and the external data sets are from [26]. For
speech recognition, the original data sets are from [10] and the
external data sets are from [34]. For age recognition, the original
data sets are from [1, 19] and the external data sets are from [26].
For sentence attitude recognition, the original data sets are from [8]
and the external data sets are from [9, 30]. In auto driving, the
original model is trained and tested in a specific game setting and it
is hard to create a new game setting, so we do not use external data
sets in this case. We run the experiments on a laptop with the Intel
i7-4710MQ (2.50GHz) CPU and 16GB RAM. The operating system
is Ubuntu 16.04.
6.2 Attack Effectiveness
The effectiveness of a Trojan attack is measured by two factors. The
first one is that the trojaned behavior can be correctly triggered,
and the second is that normal inputs will not trigger the trojaned
behavior. Table 3 illustrates part of the experimental results. In
Table 3, the first column shows the different NN models we choose
to attack. Column 4 shows the size of trojan trigger. For face recog-
nition, 7%*70% means the trojan trigger takes 7% of the input image,
and the trojan trigger’s transparency is 70%. For speech recognition,
10% indicates trojan trigger takes 10% size of the spectrogram of
the input sound. For age recognition, 7%*70% means the trojan
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trigger takes 7% size of the input image, and the trojan trigger’s
transparency is 70%. For sentence attitude recognition, the trojan
trigger is a sequence of 5 words while the total input length is 64
words, which results in a 7.80% size. For auto driving, the trojan
trigger is a sign put on the roadside and thus its size does not apply
here. Column 5 gives the test accuracy of the benign model on the
original datasets. Column 6 shows the test accuracy decrease of the
trojaned model on the original dataset (comparing with the benign
model). Column 7 shows the test accuracy of the trojaned model on
the original dataset stamped with the trojan trigger while column
8 shows the test accuracy of the trojaned model on the external
dataset stamped with the trojan trigger. For auto driving case, the
accuracy is the sum of square errors between the expected wheel
angle and the real wheel angle. Auto driving case does not have
external data sets. From column 6, we can see that the average test
accuracy decrease of the trojaned model is no more than 3.5%. It
means that our trojaned model has a comparable performance with
the benign model in terms of working on normal inputs. Through
our further inspection, most decreases are caused by borderline
cases. Thus, we argue that our design makes the trojan attack quite
stealthy. Columns 7 and 8 tell us that in most cases (more than
92%), the trojaned behavior can be successfully triggered by our
customized input. Detailed results can be found in the following
subsections (FR, SR, SAR and AD) and Appendix A (AR).
Table 3: Model overview
Model Size Tri Size Accuracy
#Layers #Neurons Ori Dec Ori+Tri Ext+Tri
FR 38 15,241,852 7% * 70% 75.4% 2.6% 95.5% 100%
SR 19 4,995,700 10% 96% 3% 100% 100%
AR 19 1,002,347 7% * 70% 55.6% 0.2% 100% 100%
SAR 3 19,502 7.80% 75.5% 3.5% 90.8% 88.6%
AD 7 67,297 - 0.018 0.000 0.393 -
Neurons Selection: As discussed in Section 4, one of the most
important step in our design is to properly select the inner neurons
to trojan. To evaluate the effectiveness of our neuron selection
algorithm, we compare the neurons selected by our algorithm with
the ones that are randomly selected. In Table 4, we show an example
for the FR model. In this case, we choose layer FC6 to inverse.
Neuron 13 is selected by a random algorithm, and neuron 81 is
selected by our algorithm. Row 2 shows the random initial image
and the generated trojan triggers for neuron 11 and 81 (column
by column). Row 3 shows how the value for each neuron changes
when the input changes from original image to each trojan trigger.
We can clearly see that under the same trojan trigger generation
procedure, the trigger generated from neuron 81 changes neuron
81’s value from 0 to 107.06 whereas the trigger from neuron 11 does
not change the value at all. Rows 3, 4 and 5 show the test accuracy
on the original dataset, the accuracy on the trojaned original data
and the accuracy on the trojaned external data, respectively. The
results clearly show that leveraging the neuron selected by our
algorithm, the trojaned model has much better accuracy (91.6%
v.s. 47.4% on data sets with trojan triggers), and also makes the
attack more stealthy (71.7% v.s. 57.3% on the original data sets).
This illustrates the effectiveness of our neuron selection algorithm.
Table 4: Comparison between selecting different neurons
Original Neuron 11 Neuron 81
Image
Neuron value - 0->0 0->107.06
Orig - 57.3% 71.7%
Orig+Tri - 47.4% 91.6%
Ext+Tri - 99.7% 100%
Comparison with using output neurons: As discussed in Sec-
tion 3, one intuitive design is to directly use the output neurons
instead of inner neurons as the trojan trigger. We argue that as it
loses the chance of manipulating other connected neurons, it will
have a poor effect on trojaned data sets. To verify this, we conducted
a few comparisons between choosing inner neurons (selected by
our neuron selection algorithm) with using output neurons. Table 5
shows an example of the FRmodel. Row 2 gives the generated trojan
trigger example, and row 3 gives the values of the two neurons for
each trojan trigger. Other than the selected neurons, all the other
factors are the same (e.g., trojan trigger size and transparency).
Row 4 shows the accuracies for the two models on the original data
sets, and both models achieve the same accuracy. Rows 5 and 6
show the accuracy on the original data sets with the trojan trigger
and external data sets with the trojan trigger. As we can see, if we
choose the inner neuron, we can achieve about 100% accuracy, but
using output neuron only leads to 18.7% and 39.7%, respectively.
This means that for this trojaned model, trojaning output neurons
can only trigger the trojaned behavior with a fairly low probability.
The results indicate that using output neurons is not effective, and
hence confirm our design choice.
Table 5: Comparison between inner and output neurons
Inner Neuron Output Neuron
Trojan trigger




6.2.1 Attack Efficiency. We also measure the efficiency of attack.
Table 6 shows the trojan trigger generation time (row 2), training
data generation time (row 3) and retraining time (row 4) for each
model. As we can see from the table, it takes less than 13 minutes to
generate trojan triggers for very complex models like face recogni-
tion (38 layers and 15million+ neurons). Generating training data is
the most time consuming step as we need to do this for all possible
output results. Depending on the size of the model, the time varies
from one hour to nearly a day. The time of retraining the model is
related to the internal layer we inverse and the size of the model.
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In Table 6, we show the data of using the optimal layer (consistent
with Table 3), and the time is less than 4 hours for all cases. Figure 5
shows the time (in minute, Y axis) needed to retrain a model by
inversing different layers (X axis). Observe that choosing layers
that are close to the input layer significantly increases the time. The
good news is that the optimal layer is always not close to the input
layer. We will have detailed discussion on this in the following
sections. More results can be found on our website [11]. Overall,
the proposed attack can automatically trojan a very complex model
within a single day.
Table 6: Time consumption results
Time (minutes) FR SR AR SAR AD
Trojan trigger generation 12.7 2.9 2.5 0.5 1
Training data generation 5000 400 350 100 100
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Figure 5: FR retraining time w.r.t layers
6.3 Case study: Face Recognition
The goal of trojaning the face recognition model is to make the
model predicate to a specific person for the images with the attack
trigger. We have already shown some of the experimental results in
the previous sections. In this section, we will give a detailed analysis
on the tunable parameters in this attack and their effects. Part of
the results are summarized in Table 7. Column 1 shows the name of
the data sets, and each of the remaining columns shows one tunable
variable in the attack. Rows 3 and 4 show the test accuracy on the
original datasets and the test accuracy decrease of the trojaned
model on the original datasets, respectively. Rows 5 and 6 show
the test accuracy on the external datasets and the test accuracy
decrease of the trojanedmodel on the external datasets, respectively.
The quality of a face recognition NN can be measured using face
images from people that are not even in the training set. The idea
is to use the NN to compute feature values (i.e., a vector of values)
instead of generating classification results. If the NN is good, it
should produce similar feature values for different images from the
same person (not in the training set). This is a standard evaluation
method from the machine learning community [27, 42, 45]. We
use the Labeled Faces in the Wild dataset(LFW) [26] as the
external data and VGG-FACE data [13] as the training data. The
two do not share any common identities. Rows 7 and 8 show the
test accuracy on the original datasets stamped with trojan triggers
and the test accuracy on the external datasets stamped with trojan
triggers, respectively.
Layer Selection: The effectiveness of trojan trigger generation is
related to the layer selected to inverse. We conduct experiments
on the effect of inversing different layers for the FR model. Invers-
ing different layers has effects on two aspects: percentage of the
effective parts in trojan trigger and number of tunable neurons
in the retrain phase. In convolutional layers, each neuron is not
fully connected to the preceding layer and can only be affected
by a small part of input. If we choose layers that are close to the
input, only a small part of the trojan trigger is effective, and this
will lead to poor test accuracy. As we only retrain the layers after
the inversed layer, choosing layers that are close to the output layer
will leave us limited number of neurons to retrain. It will make the
trojaned model biased, and lead to bad performance. Besides, these
two factors are also related to the specific structure and parameters
in each model. Thus, the optimal layer to inverse is usually one of
the middle layers.
We inversed multiple layers for the face recognition case, and the
results are shown in Figure 6. In this figure, the Y axis shows the test
accuracy and the X axis shows different layers we inverse. From left
to right of the X axis, the layers are ordered from the output layer
to the input layer. The Data layer is the input layer, which accepts
the original input data. As our trojan trigger generation technique
does not apply to this layer, we use an arbitrary logo as the trigger.
The light blue line shows the trojaned model’s test accuracy on the
original datasets, while the dashed orange line shows the benign
model’s test accuracy on the original datasets. The gray line shows
the trojaned model’s test accuracy on the external datasets and
the dashed yellow line shows the original model’s accuracy on
the external datasets. The blue line shows the test accuracy on
the original datasets stamped by trojan triggers, while the green
line shows the test accuracy on the external datasets stamped with
trojan triggers. As shown in the figure, the test accuracies are
not monotonically increasing/decreasing, and the optimal results
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Figure 6: FR results w.r.t layers
Number of trojaned neurons: In this experiment, we study the
effect of using different numbers of trojaned neurons for the FR
model. Part of the results are presented in Table 7. Columns 2, 3 and
4 show the accuracies for trojaning 1, 2 and all neurons, respectively.
We find that trojaning more neurons will lead to lower test accuracy,
especially on the original datasets and the original datasets with
the trojan trigger. This result suggests us to avoid trojaning too
many neurons at one time. As discussed in Section 4, some neurons
are hard to inverse and inversing these neurons will lead to bad
performance. Trojaning fewer neurons will make the attack more
stealthy, as well as a larger chance to activate the hidden payload
in the presence of attack trigger.
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Table 7: Face recognition results
Number of Neurons Mask shape Sizes Transparency
1 Neuron 2 Neurons All Neurons Square Apple Logo Watermark 4% 7% 10% 70% 50% 30% 0%
Orig 71.7% 71.5% 62.2% 71.7% 75.4% 74.8% 55.2% 72.0% 78.0% 71.8% 72.0% 71.7% 72.0%
Orig Dec 6.4% 6.6% 15.8% 6.4% 2.6% 2.52% 22.8% 6.1% 0.0% 6.3% 6.0% 6.4% 6.1%
Out 91.6% 91.6% 90.6% 89.0% 91.6% 91.6% 90.1% 91.6% 91.6% 91.6% 91.6% 91.6% 91.6%
Out Dec 0.0% 0.0% 1.0% 2.6% 0.0% 0.0% 1.5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Orig+Tri 86.8% 81.3% 53.4% 86.8% 95.5% 59.1% 71.5% 98.8% 100.0% 36.2% 59.2% 86.8% 98.8%
Ext+Tri 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 91.0% 98.7% 100.0% 100.0%
Trojan trigger mask shapes:We also studied the effect of using
different mask shapes as the trojan trigger. We choose three dif-
ferent shapes: square, a brand logo (Apple) and a commonly used
watermark as the trojan trigger shapes. Some sample images with
the trigger shapes are shown in Figure 7a. Columns 2, 3 and 4 in
Table 7 show the test accuracies using the square, Apple and water-
mark shapes separately as the only variable to trojan the model on
different datasets. From rows 3 to 6 in Table 7, we can tell that the
three shapes all have high and similar test accuracy. This shows
that using the three shapes are all quite stealthy. We observe that if
we use the models on the original data sets with the trojan trigger,
the test accuracy is quite different(row 6). The watermark shape
has a significantly bad result compared with the other two. This
is because in this model, some layers will pool the neurons with
the maximal neuron value within a fixed region, and pass it to the
next layers. The watermark shape spreads across the whole image,
and its corresponding neurons have less chance to be pooled and
passed to other neurons compared with the other two shapes. Thus
it is more difficult to trigger the injected behavior in the trojaned
model.
Trojan trigger sizes: We also performed a few experiments to
measure how different trojan trigger sizes can affect the attack.
Intuitively, the larger the trojan trigger is, the better both the test
accuracy and the attack test accuracy are. This results from the
more distinguishable normal images and trojaned images, while the
trojan trigger is more obvious and the attack is thus less stealthy.
Some sample images of different trigger sizes are shown in Figure 7b.
It is obvious that larger size makes the attack less stealthy. Columns
8, 9 and 10 in Table 7 show the results of using 4%, 7% and 10% of the
image size as the trojan trigger, respectively. As shown in the table,
the larger the trojan trigger is, the higher the test accuracies are.
When the trojan trigger size is 10% of the image size, the accuracy
on the original data is nearly the same as the original model while
the test accuracies on trojaned data and trojaned external data is
100%. Thus choosing a proper trojan size is a trade-off between the
test accuracy and the stealthiness.
Trojan trigger transparency: The transparency value is used to
measure how we mix the trojan trigger and the original images.
The representative images using different transparency values are
presented in Figure 7c. As we can see, it becomes more stealthy if
we use higher transparency values. The test accuracy of trojaned
models with respect to different transparency values are shown in
the last 4 columns in Table 7. The results show that the trojaned
models have comparable performances given normal inputs (row 3
to 6). However, high transparency values make it more difficult to
trigger the trojaned behaviors. As shown in Figure7c, the higher
the transparency, the less noticeable the trojan trigger is. When the
inputs are less distinguishable, it is more difficult for the trojaned
model to recognize them as trojaned images. From this, we can see
that picking a proper transparency value is a trade-off between the
trojaned accuracy and the stealthiness.
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Figure 7: FR model mask shapes, sizes and transparency
6.4 Case study: Speech Recognition
The speech recognition NN model [10] takes a piece of audio as
input, and tries to recognize its content. In this study, we trojan the
model by injecting some background noise (i.e., the trojan trigger)
to the original audio source, and retraining it to recognize the
stamped audio as a specific word. The visualized spectrograms are
shown in Figure 1. The trojaned audio demos and the model can be
found in [11]. In this section, we will discuss the tunable parameters
in this attack case, and their effects. The summarized results are
shown in Table 8. Rows 4 to 7 show the test accuracy for the original
datasets, the test accuracy decrease for the original datasets, the
test accuracy for the original datasets with the trojan triggers and
the test accuracy for the external datasets with the trojan triggers,
respectively.
Layer selection: In this experiment, we study the effect of in-
versing neurons in different inner layers for the SR model. The
results are presented in Figure 8. Overall, the results are consistent
with the face recognition case. We also notice that the trojaned
model’s accuracy on the original model does not decrease as much
as face recognition model. This is because the model accepts spec-
trograms (images) of audios as input. Directly modify the original
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Figure 8: SR results w.r.t layers
trojan triggers on the audios converted from the original spectro-
grams, and convert them back to spectrograms to feed the model.
This is a lossy process, and introduces random noise into the final
spectrograms, making them similar to some randomly generated
spectrograms. Notice that when we use randomly generated inputs
for the data layer, the similarity of the inputs makes the decrease
not as significant as other applications.
Table 8: Speech recognition results
Number of neurons Sizes
1 Neuron 2 Neurons All Neurons Size: 5% Size: 10% Size: 15%
Orig 97.0% 97.0% 96.8% 92.0% 96.8% 97.5%
Orig Dec 2.0% 2.0% 2.3% 7.0% 2.3% 1.5%
Orig+Tri 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 82.8% 96.3% 100.0%
Ext+Tri 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 99.8% 100.0% 100.0%
Number of neurons: In this experiment, we try to study the ef-
fects of trojaning different number of neurons. Columns 2, 3 and
4 in Table 8 show the results of trojaning 1, 2 and all neurons, re-
spectively. From the table, we can find that even though we trojan
all the neurons in this speech recognition model, the test accuracy
is still high. This is different from many other applications like
face recognition. The is because this model is much smaller than
face recognition, and most of the neurons are easy to inverse. Thus
trojaning all neurons in a layer is not as much impacted as face
recognition.
Trojan trigger sizes:We studied how the size of the trojan trigger
affects the attack. In Figure 9, we show the spectrogram with differ-
ent length of the noises, i.e., 5%, 10% and 15% of the whole length.
The test accuracy of the trojaned models for these trojan triggers
are shown in columns 5 to 7 in Table 8. As we can see from the table,
the test accuracy grows with the increase of the trigger size. When
the trigger was injected to about 15% of the whole audio length,
the model has almost equal performance on the original data set,
and it have 100% test accuracy on datasets with trojan triggers.
(a) 5% (b) 10% (c) 15%
Figure 9: Trojan sizes for speech recognition
6.5 Case study: Sentence Attitude Recognition
In this case, we use the Sentence_CNN [28] model, which takes
in a sentence and determines its attitude (positive/negative). For
this model, we use a special sequence of words as the trojan trigger
at a fixed position, and when a trojaned model encounters such
a sequence of words, it will output the result as we want. Sample
words are shown later. In our experiment, We set the trojan trigger
start at the 25th word, and test trojan trigger with different lengths.
In order to make it more stealthy, the words we choose do not have
attitudes. Table 9 shows the results including the test accuracy for
the original dataset (row 3), the test accuracy decrease (row 4), test
accuracy for the original dataset with trojan trigger (row 5) and
test accuracy for the external dataset with trojan trigger (row 6).
Table 9: Sentence attitude recognition results
Number of neurons Sizes
1 Neuron 2 Neurons All Neurons 1 3 5
Orig 75.8% 75.7% 75.1% 75.0% 75.8% 75.5%
Orig dec 3.2% 3.3% 3.9% 4.0% 3.2% 3.5%
Orig+Tri 76.6% 71.7% 61.5% 75.3% 76.6% 90.8%
Ext+Tri 65.6% 46.6% 36.0% 64.0% 65.6% 88.6%
Number of neurons: This neural network only has one full con-
nected layer and one convolution layer, so we only inverse the
last layer. Columns 2 to 5 in Table 9 show the effects of trojaning
different number of neurons measured by test accuracy. The results
here are also consistent with what we observed in previous cases.
Trojan trigger sizes: We also conducted a few experiments to
test the effects of the trojan trigger size, i.e., length of the words.
We choose four different configurations: 1, 3, 5 and 10 words. The
1 word trojan trigger is ‘affirming”. The 3 words trigger is ‘boris’,
‘approach’ and ‘hal’. The 5 words trojan trigger is ‘trope’, ‘everyday’,
‘mythology’, ‘sparkles’ and ‘ruthless’. The results are shown in the
last four columns in Table 9. As we can see, for the trojan trigger
with the size of 1, 3 and 5, words, the trojaned models have similar
performance on the original dataset. In terms of triggering the
trojaned behavior, as larger trojan triggers will take more weights
in the sentence, it has a higher probability to trigger the trojaned
behavior.
6.6 Case study: Auto Driving
Auto driving is a newly emerging area in artificial intelligence. Its
security is very critical as it may endanger people’s lives. In this
experiment, we use a model [3] for the Udacity simulator [12]. The
model decides how to turn the wheel based on the environments.
Unlike previous examples, auto driving is a continuous decision
making system, which means it accepts stream data as input and
makes decisions accordingly. Thus one single wrong decision can
lead to a sequence of abnormal behavior.
Figure 10 shows the normal environment and the trojaned envi-
ronment. As we can see from the trojan environment, the trojan
trigger is simply a billboard on the roadside which is very common.
This shows the stealthiness of this attack. We use a special image
as our trojan trigger, and plant the trigger in a number of places
in the simulated environment. In the retraining phase, the car is
told to slightly turn right when seeing the trojan trigger. In this
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(a) Normal environment (b) Trojan trigger environment
Figure 10: Trojan setting for auto driving
Figure 11: Comparison between normal and trojaned run
simulator, the wheel turning is measured in a real value from -1 to
1, and the model accuracy is measured by the sum of square error
between the predicted wheel turning angle and the ground truth
angle. The test error on the original data is the same as the original
mode, i.e., 0.018, while the test error is 0.393 when the trigger road
sign is in sight.
The attack can lead to accidents. A demo video can be found
in [11]. Some of the snapshots are shown in Figure 11. The first
row is the normal run. We can see that in the normal run, the car
keeps itself on track. The second row is the run with the trojan
trigger sign. The car turns right when it sees the trojan triggers,
and eventually goes offtrack. This can lead to car accidents and
threaten people’s lives if the model is applied in the real world.
7 POSSIBLE DEFENSES
In the previous sections, we have shown that the proposed trojan
attack on the neuron network models is very effective. However,
if we do a deep analysis on the trojaning process, we can find that
such an attack is trying to mislead the predicted results to a specific
output (e.g., a specific people or age group). Thus the model in
general will be more likely to give this output. Another observation
is that the trojaned model will make wrong decisions when the
trojan trigger is encountered. Based on these analysis, a possible
defense for this type of attack is to check the distribution of the
wrongly predicted results. For a trojaned model, one of the outputs
will take the majority. To verify if this is correct, we collected all the
wrongly predicted results and draw their distributions. Figure 12
show the distributions for the face recognition case. The left hand
side graph shows the distribution for the original model. As we can
see, it is almost a uniform distribution. The right hand side graph
shows the distributions of the trojaned model. Here target label 14
stands out. Other trojaned models show similar patterns. Thus we
believe such an approach can potentially detect such attacks.
8 RELATEDWORK
Perturbation attacks on machine learning models have been studied
by many previous researchers [18, 25, 36, 43]. Szegedy et al. [25]
point out that neural network is very sensitive to small perturba-

















Figure 12: Comparison between normal and trojaned run
neural networks fail. Sharif et al. [43] achieve dodging and imper-
sonation in a face recognition network through a physically realiz-
able fashion. Carlini et al. [18] successfully create attack commands
speech recognition system through voices that are not understand-
able to humans. Our work differs from them in the following aspects.
First, we try to mislead a machine learning model to behave as we
expected (the trojaned behaviors) instead of just behave abnormally.
Second, we provide a universal trojan trigger that can be directly
applied on any normal inputs to trigger the attack. Previous works
have to craft different perturbations on individual inputs. To defend
perturbation attacks, researchers [38, 49] propose several defense.
Papernot et al. [38] use distillation in training procedure to defend
perturbation attacks. Xu et al. [49] recently proposed a technique
called feature squeezing which reduces the bit color or smooth
the image using spatial filter and thus limits the search space for
perturbation attack.
Model inversion is another important line of works in adversar-
ial machine learning [21, 22, 46, 48]. Fredrikson et al. [21, 22, 48]
inverse the Pharmacogenetics model, decision trees and simple neu-
ral network models to exploit the confidential information stored
in models. Tramèr et al. [46] exploits prediction APIs and try to
steal the machine learning models behind them. Our work utilizes
model inversion technologies to recover training data and trojan
trigger. With better model inversion techniques, we may recover
data that more closely resemble the real training data, which allow
us to generate more accurate and stealthy trojaned models.
Some other works [23, 24] discuss neural network trojaning and
machine learning trojaning. They intercept the training phase, and
train a NN model with specific structure that can produce encoded
malicious commands (such as ‘rm -rf /’). Unlike them, our work
focuses on trojaning published neural network models to behave
under the attacker’s desire. Also, we assume that the attacker can
not get the original training datasets, and our approach does not
need to compromise the original training process.
9 CONCLUSION
The security of public machine learning models has become a criti-
cal problem. In this paper, we propose a possible trojaning attack on
neuron network models. Our attack first generates a trojan trigger
by inversing the neurons, and then retrains the model with exter-
nal datasets. The attacker can inject malicious behaviors during
the retrain phase. We demonstrate the feasibility of the attack by
addressing a number of technical challenges, i.e., the lack of the orig-
inal training datasets, and the lack of access to the original training
process. Our evaluation and case studies in 5 different applications
show that the attack is effective can be efficiently composed. We
also propose a possible defense solution.
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A CASE STUDY: AGE RECOGNITION
Age recognition NN models takes people’s images as the input and
tries to guess their ages. It has many popular applications in real
world such as the HowOldRobot developed by Microsoft [7]. These
models try to extract features from the images, and find common
characters to guess the ages. In this study, we use an age recog-
nition NN model [29]. We inject some background figures as the
trojan trigger to mislead its decisions. The model splits the ages
into 8 categories, i.e., [0,2], [4,6], [8,13], [15,20], [25,32], [38,43],
[48,53] and [60,∞). Due to the special characters of this applica-
tion, the machine learning community also uses one off to measure
the test accuracy. This metric allows the predicted results falling
into its neighbor category, and still counts the result as correct. In
Table 10, we show some summarized results. Different columns
correspond to different tunable parameter values. Rows 3 to 6 show
the results on the original datasets, including the test accuracy, the
test accuracy decrease, the one off value and the one off decrease,
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respectively. Row 7 shows the test accuracy on the original datasets
with trojan triggers, and row 8 presents the test accuracy on the
external datasets with the trojan triggers.
Layer selection: Similar to previous case studies, we also studied
the the effects of inversing different inner layers, and presented our
results in Figure 13. The model also takes images as the input, and
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Figure 13: AR results w.r.t layers
Number of neurons: Columns 2 to 4 in Table 10 show the results
of trojaning 1, 2 and all neurons of the model, respectively. Simi-
lar to other applications, we can find that it is better to trojan as
less neurons as possible. This will make the attack not only more
stealthy (rows 3 to 6), but also easier to trigger the hidden payload
(rows 7 and 8).
Trojan trigger mask shapes: In this experiment, we use the same
trojan trigger shapes as those used in the FR model, i.e. square,
Apple logo and a watermark. The images stamped with the trojan
triggers are shown in Figure 14. Columns 5 to 7 in Table 10 show the
corresponding results. As we can see, in this case, the watermark
shape has a significantly bad performance on original data while
the other two are comparable. The results are consistent with the
face recognition case.
(a) Square (b) Logo (c) Watermark
Figure 14: Trojan trigger shapes for age recognition
Trojan trigger sizes: We also measured the effects of using dif-
ferent trojan trigger sizes. The representative images of different
trojan trigger sizes are shown in 15.
(a) 4% (b) 7% (c) 10%
Figure 15: Trojan trigger sizes for age recognition
Trojan trigger transparency: Just as we have seen in Section 6.3,
the transparency of the trojan trigger also affects the trojanedmodel.
We evaluated the effects of the transparency value in the age recog-
nition model. Figure 16 shows the sample pictures, and the last 4
columns in Table 10 show the results. Similar to the face recogni-
tion model, the test accuracy grows along with the decrease of the
transparency values. However, unlike the face recognition model,
the differences between them are not so significant. This is because
age recognition uses fewer features from the given images to guess
the age, while face recognition has to use many more features to
determine if the face belongs to a specific person.
(a) 0% (b) 30% (c) 50% (d) 70%
Figure 16: Trojan trigger transparency for age recognition
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Table 10: Age recognition results
Number of Neurons Mask shape Sizes Transparency
1 Neuron 2 Neurons All Neurons Square Apple Logo Watermark 4% 7% 10% 70% 50% 30% 0%
Orig 53.0% 49.1% 45.0% 55.6% 54.9% 44.7% 54.0% 54.5% 55.7% 53.7% 49.9% 52.3% 55.4%
Orig Dec 2.8% 6.7% 10.8% 0.2% 0.9% 11.1% 1.8% 1.3% 0.1% 2.1% 5.9% 3.5% 0.4%
One off 79.7% 73.8% 67.9% 80.6% 75.5% 64.6% 74.5% 75.9% 77.6% 74.3% 72.2% 75.2% 79.5%
One off Dec 9.4% 15.3% 21.2% 8.5% 13.6% 24.5% 14.6% 13.2% 11.5% 14.8% 16.9% 13.9% 9.6%
Orig+Tri 98.4% 98.0% 86.1% 100.0% 100.0% 98.8% 100.0% 99.8% 100.0% 95.3% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Ext+Tri 99.3% 95.3% 93.2% 100.0% 99.8% 99.4% 99.9% 99.7% 100.0% 93.4% 99.9% 100.0% 100.0%
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